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Abstract
Regions and the regional powers that characterize them stand in mul-
tiple inter-relations with the world system. Yet, theories of International
Relations struggle with the conceptualization of this global-regional
nexus. This article introduces an analytical tool that allows for the evalu-
ation of the ‘embeddedness’ of regions into the international system
and its consequences for a regional power in ‘its’ region. The theoretical
tool shows in particular that regional powers do not necessarily have an
inherent interest in ‘their’ region and its stabilization or, in general, the
provision of public goods. Instead, global interests can prevail. Thus,
the decision to engage positively in the region is one that does not
automatically follow from relative preponderance as it is assumed by
many analysts of regional powerhood in the case study chosen here,
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South Asia, and across the globe. The applicability of this analytical tool
is illustrated with the help of two speciﬁc examples – India’s conﬂict
management in Sri Lanka and its role in the democratization process in
Nepal.
1 Introduction
India’s foreign policy within its South Asian region has often been
described as ‘confusing’, ‘inconsistent’, ‘plain absent’, or ‘ironic’
(Sharma, 2009, p. 36; cited from Malone, 2011, p. 126f.). Empirical
instances that are cited in support of this assumption are manifold,
among them India’s reluctance to intervene in Sri Lanka’s civil war
despite the willingness and active demand by the Sri Lankan government
for India to do so and despite the imminent threat of a closer involve-
ment of external forces, above all China, in Sri Lanka. Another example
is India’s lack of support for Nepal’s democratization process and its
lack of a clear positioning against the authoritarian tendencies of the
King Gyandendra in a time, when much of India’s global reputation
rested on its status as democracy in a region characterized by internal
stability and unrest. Yet, while much descriptive work has been published
on speciﬁc case studies within South Asia as well as India’s more general
outlook on South Asia (Ayoob, 1989; Mohan, 2002; Mitra, 2003; Muni,
2009) and its growing linkages with East and Southeast Asia and the
world (Jaffrelot, 2003; Paul, 2006; Das, 2010), political scientists or
International Relations scholars seem to, for the most, shy away from
theory-oriented studies of the subcontinent and its complicated
relationships.1
There are obviously exceptions to this rule, and attempts have been
made to explain India’s regional policy by reference to hegemony or
other theories that built on the asymmetrical distribution of power preva-
lent among South Asian countries. This literature also at times looks
at the history of relations, patterns of ‘amity and enmity’, and so forth
(e.g. Buzan and Waever, 2003; DeVotta, 2003; Destradi, 2008; Frazier
and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). Indeed, the speciﬁc pattern of big-state–
1 This of course excludes India–Pakistan relations that also, clearly, have a very strong
bearing on the rest of the region (Ganguly and Hagerty, 2005; Wolpert, 2010).
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small-state dynamics that occur between India and ‘the rest’ portrays
some remarkable features from which, arguably, a lot could be learnt in
terms of ‘hierarchical relations’ among state actors within the inter-
national system, in general, and at a regional level of analysis in particu-
lar. This article advances one particular aspect of regional hierarchical
relations that is often overlooked in the existing literature: the impact of
what is introduced here as the ‘embeddedness’ of regions into the inter-
national system. The ambition is not to discard other explanations,
particularly those building on historical, domestic, and cultural factors,
as South Asian politics – as politics in any region – are too complex to
be narrowed down to a single explanatory factor. Instead, the aim was
to introduce an analytical tool that helps explain some particularly puz-
zling instances of, ﬁrst, India’s role in South Asia and, second, regional
power behavior, in general, which remains unaccounted for in-existing
approaches.
Subsequently, this article will discuss in brief what is meant by embed-
dedness and its possible consequences for our understanding of Indian’s
foreign policy as well as, potentially, of other regional powers’ behavior.
The key argument is that both examples show that states – such as
India – that are considered to be regional powers, do not necessarily
demonstrate an inherent ‘interest’ to extend their inﬂuence on their
regions. Hence, whether a regional power invests in enhancing stability
or economic growth in the region is not only a consequence of its mater-
ial power potential to do so. This is also based on other factors, such as
the regional power’s ambitions in global politics in combination with
domestic and regional politics, that need further exploration. The central
empirical focus of the article lies on the illustration of embeddedness as
useful concept to analyze these two case studies: India’s engagement or
nonengagement in the ethnic conﬂict in Sri Lanka, particularly in the
year 2000, but also afterwards; and India’s involvement in the inter-
national effort to avoid state failure in Nepal between 2001 and 2006.
These are two important episodes in South Asian conﬂict management
from which one can make statements about what kind of regional power
India is and explain its speciﬁc outlook on the region and the inter-
national system.
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2 Regional powers and their embeddedness in the
international system
The theme of ‘regional power’ has received growing attention in the
literature. Regional powers feature prominently in research on regional
integration institutionalization (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Hurrell,
2005; Acharya and Johnston, 2007; Capling and Nossal, 2009; Kubicek,
2009), as important veto players in international organizations
(Nolte, 2010; Godehardt and Nabers, 2011) and, for example, as provi-
ders or spoilers of regional stability, democratization, and peace (Lake
and Morgan, 1997; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Adler and Greve, 2009). In
almost any piece on the role of regional powers, however, a speciﬁc range
of expectations is set on regional powers, particularly in empirical
studies. Cases include South Africa, India, Australia, and Brazil, all of
whom have been expected either to serve, for example, as engines of
growth in their region or to play an active role in bringing peace and sta-
bility to often frail neighborhoods. Whether or not these expectations are
fulﬁlled varies across cases; the case discussed here, India, is, however,
not the only state that has puzzled political and academic observers with
its lack of engagement with the region. As it will be shown later, the pol-
itical and military conﬂicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka gave India ample
chance to ‘proof ’ its regional power stance. Yet, it has for the most failed
to do so.
In order to capture regional power behavior theoretically, the argu-
ment made here is that we need to ask where these expectations are
coming from and whether they are justiﬁed. In the existing studies, often
implicitly or explicitly, hegemony theories are applied to study the re-
gional powers. These powers have been analyzed as ‘emerging middle
powers’ (cf. Van der Westhuizen, 1998; Jordaan, 2003; Schoeman,
2003), pivotal states (Landsberg, 2004, p. 1), regional great powers
(Østerud, 1992), regional leaders (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010;
Nolte, 2010), or indeed regional hegemons (Destradi, 2008).2 All of
these concepts are linked to the assumption of some form of ‘regional re-
sponsibility’, regional public good provision, or regional role model func-
tion – or in general, hegemonic behavior, which is assumed to arise
2 The existence of multiple concepts applied to basically the same group of states is a serious
in the pursuit of a common research agenda and hinders theoretical and conceptual
advances.
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directly or indirectly from regional material preponderance alone. The
absence of such behavior thus challenges some of the central theoretical
assumptions prevailing in the literature. Hence, according to this litera-
ture, states deﬁned as regional powers or regional hegemons appear
weak and unwilling to use their material preponderance to achieve the
goals of stability, economic development, or peace within the region.
In this article, I argue that it is not a failure of the states to act as a re-
gional power. Rather, our conceptual and theoretical tools are either un-
suitable or incomplete to analyze the varieties of regional power types
and regional power behavior that we encounter in the real world.
Current applications instead tell us little about how regional powers use
their predominance and help us even less to understand the obvious dif-
ferences and their more subtle commonalties. Instead, regional power
initially is broadly deﬁned as a ‘materially preponderant actor, relative to
other actors from within the same region’ (Prys, 2012, p. 17).3 Within
this group of state, different forms and different features of regional
powers can occur – as regional powers do not, ceteris paribus, act in an
uniform manner. What is of importance here is that we take into account
the speciﬁcities of the regional level at which the phenomenon of region-
al powers is placed. Regional powers may, for instance, prefer to interact
3 A ﬁrst step in the deﬁnition of a ‘regional power’ obviously needs to be a rather clear
understanding of what we meant by a region, a concept that embraces all the features of a
‘contested concept’. Some of the more useful and recent deliberations on the concept have
moved the debate an eclectic or ‘staged’ approach to regions (Hurrell 1995, p. 73; Ayoob
1999, p. 111ff; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002, p. 39ff; De Lombaerde et al. 2010). This
includes a clear view on the territorial foundation of regions, yet, there is no determinism
about which territorial boundaries are signiﬁcant. Instead, speciﬁc boundaries become rele-
vant through a process of deﬁnition by both actors internal and external to a potential
region. Within these regional spaces, different levels of ‘regionness’ can occur, nourished by
regular co-operation or conﬂict, or even by both types of interaction (Hettne and
Söderbaum, 2002, p. 38). Yet, all of these factors are politically contingent in different
ways, and thus, the ‘drawing of lines’ is a political act that is frequently used ‘to hold down
the ﬂuid elements of global life in the general interests of [a] “region” ’ (Allen and
Cochrane, 2007, p. 1163). From this approach – and despite its relative openness – this
article draws two common characteristics or patterns that exemplify the signiﬁcance of
‘regionness’: ﬁrst, geographic proximity and, secondly, the fact that the region is less than
the whole or, in other words, there are ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ to a region. These factors
give rise to the concept of embeddedness as understood here. Regions are embedded into
the international system and therefore, can be classiﬁed as open systems with permeable
borders. Embeddedness makes regions and even their most powerful states vulnerable to
external impacts, yet also provides additional opportunities for regional powers to pursue
external partnerships or other forms of interactions, which in turn can alter regional
dynamics.
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and engage with actors outside its region that are economically more
developed and, simultaneously, to treat the region with neglect.
Benevolence should therefore not be taken for granted. In summary, this
understanding of regional powerhood presumes a conceptualization of
regional power as a ‘variable’. In this form, it remains at a level of ab-
straction that allows for different types of regional powers to emerge.
The concepts offered here were deﬁned and discussed in previous studies
(Prys 2010, 2012). There, three categories of regional powers have been
conceptualized by means of a theoretically and methodologically
informed conceptual analysis: dominant regional powers, regional hege-
mons, and detached regional powers.
Domination, in brief, is used in situations where force prevails over
consensus, where relations are highly asymmetrical and private good pro-
vision dominates over public goods provision by the regional power.
Another clear characteristic of domination is its one-sidedness. The state
at a center of such constellation commands and extracts involuntary tri-
butes from the secondary states under a constant threat of force. At the
regional level, this has implications for secondary states’ relations with
both the regional power and outside actors; in particular, relations with
outsiders are expected to be much more intense as a counterbalance to
the regional dominator is sought. Hegemons, or more precisely regional
hegemons, create a ‘political order in which the hegemon’s mode of
thinking becomes dominant without a regular reference to violence’
(adapted from Showstack Sassoon, 1982, p. 94). In contrast to domina-
tors, they undertake to make a disproportional contribution in solving
challenges and providing stability in the region. In this way, they ensure,
at least partly, the pursuit of common goods for all or most members
from within its sphere of inﬂuence. Detached regional powers, a status
induced either by the absence of adequate resources or by the lack of
identiﬁcation with the region, are states that focus largely on domestic
and/or on global politics, instead of their regional roles. The introduction
of this last category is vital if we would like to overcome the over-
determinism that characterizes the studies of regional powers. It is, in
other words, not to be taken for granted that a regional power, as
deﬁned above, will automatically strive for control, whether benevolent
or coercive, over the region. Instead, it might as well attempt to disentan-
gle itself from the potential costs and constraints arising from a regional
role. Thus, rather than assuming that all regional powers have an interest
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in inﬂuencing their regional neighbors in one way or the other, variance
in regional power attitudes and behavior exists. As an analytical tool, the
three ideal types of regional powerhood are assumed to capture a fairly
complete spectrum of different roles a regional power can play. Regional
powers also may, for instance, evolve over time from one type to the
other; yet, no linear development in one or the other direction should be
expected from this.
In addition to this three-fold categorization, we introduce the concept
of embeddedness of regions in the international system to further capture
how the integration of regions into the global world system affects our
understanding of regional power roles, their capacity to act within and to
inﬂuence their region, and also their behavior toward ‘secondary powers’
(Flemes and Wojczewski, 2010). Regional powers, for instance, have to
operate within an overarching international system determined by the
global distribution of power and by international institutions. In addition
to the management of the internal regional order, a differentiation from,
as well as an accommodation within, the international environment has
to be established. This potentially alters expected regional dynamics and
puts limits on the level of control by the regionally preponderant state. It
also has an inﬂuence on how regional powers see themselves and how
they, consequently, use their power. For our analysis, this implies that
regions and the pursuit of localized regional power politics cannot be
assessed independently from the international system and vice versa.4
This implies that relations to external actors are signiﬁcant in determin-
ing the actions of regional powers, both as facilitating but also constrain-
ing factors. On the one hand, we therefore need to look at direct
interventions of the so-called great powers within the region, not only in
military term, but also in terms of trade agreements established with
states from within the region. On the other hand, the international arena
offers various chances for regional powers to enhance their scope for
action, such as its ability to represent the region in international bodies
such as the UN Security Council.
4 The literature offers approaches that deal with one side of this equation: the impact of
great powers onto regions. This includes the concepts of ‘overlay’, ‘penetration’, or ‘porous-
ness of regions’ (especially Buzan and Waever, 2003; Katzenstein, 2005). Overall, most of
these approaches neglect, however, the ‘inside-out’ part of ‘embeddedness’.
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The international arena, however, could also represent a constraint for
regional action by ‘consuming’ resources that could be targeted at region-
al problem-solving strategies, for example. These and other related pro-
cesses bring about interlinkages between the global and the regional
level of analysis. Therefore, the resulting double role for regional powers
necessarily creates a need for concepts and theories that can accommo-
date this. What is argued here more speciﬁcally is that by implicitly or
explicitly building on theories, such as the Theory of Hegemonic
Stability, most approaches imply that regional powers like India demon-
strate per se an automatic and inherent interest to ‘lead’ the region –
and, in consequence, the failure to do so is puzzling and demands for
explanation. In other words, an often nonreﬂective transfer of theories
from the global level provides for inaccurate standards and benchmarks
to assess the ‘real’ Indian strategies and roles in the region.
In summary, this paper takes the following approach: ﬁrst, a lack of
inﬂuence on the region should not be automatically associated with
‘regional power failure’. Secondly, explanations that refer to the apparent
‘veto power’ of smaller states in South Asia with regard to India’s leader-
ship position fall short in face of powerful factors at the ‘global-regional
nexus’ that impact on India’s choice of regional strategies and their
success (Mitra, 2003, p. 400f.). The empirical examples in the following
section will demonstrate these nexuses, where Indian regional policies
will be outlined with the help of two case studies: Nepal and Sri Lanka.
3 India in South Asia and the world
Domestic and regional conﬂicts in the South Asian region are often con-
sidered a major source of threat for both regional and global peace and
stability. Aside from the clear tensions between India and Pakistan that
top the list of potential threats due to both states’ nuclear potential, we
further need to consider that, in 2009, ﬁve of eight members of the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, featured
among the Top 25 of the Failed State Index.5 Even though the challen-
ging situations within each of the countries, clearly, need to be traced
5 Bhutan (Rank 48), India (Rank 87), and Maldives (Rank 81). The Fund for Peace (2009):
Failed State Index Scores: http://www.fundforpeace.org (3 August 2009).
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back to a complex set of domestic, regional, and international origins,
India frequently has been criticized for not living up to its appropriate
share of responsibility in this regard.6 This criticism extends, for instance,
to India’s reluctance to actively support a peaceful resolution of the
ethnic conﬂict in Sri Lanka, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s
(Gunatilleke, 2001; DeVotta, 2003); and to its apparent neglect in
playing a more inﬂuential role in preventing state failure in Nepal
throughout the past decade (Destradi, 2012). Extraregional actors such
as the United States or the European Union (EU) and its Parliament,
too, have disapproved of India’s reluctance to engage more actively in
promoting regional stability and peace (European Parliament, 2003,
2006; Vaughn, 2008; Muni, 2009).
Attempts to explain the ‘deﬁciency’ of Indian inﬂuence in the region
often fall back on the conﬂict between India and Pakistan (cf. Ganguly
and Hagerty, 2005; Sridharan, 2005; Paul, 2006). Likewise, China is
often considered to be a major obstacle in India’s attempt to consolidate
its status as the sole regional power within its own region (cf. Garver,
2001; Frankel and Harding, 2004; Malik, 2006). Only a minority of
researchers make emphasis on the generally difﬁcult relations that India
entertains with smaller neighboring states. DeVotta (2003), for instance,
argues that a lack of recognition and legitimacy of Indian leadership
should be regarded as the main obstacle in the pursuit of an Indian he-
gemony within South Asia. Likewise, Mitra (2003) emphasized the lack
of positive recognition of India by other South Asian states. He further
argues that India’s enormous material resources cannot be translated
in actual inﬂuence because of its incoherent regional strategies. In
summary, a plethora of good arguments is offered for India’s ‘failing
regional leadership’ within the existing analytical frameworks.
What is argued here, however, is that this appraisal of Indian regional
politics is incomplete. The argument is that the origins of the apparent
benchmarks, according to which India’s regional policies are ‘judged’,
6 Obviously, no simple statements can be made about South Asian politics; both at the re-
gional as well as at the domestic level. For instance, the question of national integrity and
identity is a challenge in all South Asian states, a problem that has a strong inﬂuence on re-
gional interactions, in particular when it comes to bilateral relations between India and its
smaller neighbors; moreover, domestic problems such as access to water, demographic
changes, unemployment, or health care in all states of the region have an impact on the re-
gional cohesion.
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are unclear. In other words, how do we really recognize ‘failure’ in re-
gional policies when we see it? As it will be shown in the sections below,
political scientists need to assume a much broader perspective when ana-
lyzing regional powers than is commonly done; a perspective that allows
for the consideration of all kinds of structural constraints and incentives
that arise from the embeddedness of regions and their regional powers
into the international system. For India, particularly since the end of the
Cold War, its international engagement has shifted from a position of –
even if incomplete – nonalignment to an engagement in all kinds of
international institutions and coalitions, such as Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa, the G-5, the BASIC coalition within the climate
change regime and the G-20 where it has assumed leading positions
(among many others Bajpai, 2010; Stephen, 2012). At the regional level,
tensions with neighboring states – above all Pakistan, but also
Bangladesh – remain high. Despite an at least rhetorically increased sig-
niﬁcance for Indian foreign policy-making, cooperation within the main
regional institution – the SAARC, founded in 1985, has not brought any
considerable advances, neither in the ﬁeld of economic integration nor in
the improvement of relations with neighbors in general – (Malone, 2011,
p. 127; Behuria et al., 2012; Rao, 2012). Together with on-going domes-
tic strives (ranging from the need for poverty eradication, securing eco-
nomic development, corruption, and internal destabilization by, for
instance, the Naxalite movement), a strong need emerges to balance out
preferences and interests that arise on the ‘multiple playing ﬁelds’ (e.g.
Malone, 2011, p. 296f.; Mukherjee and Malone, 2011).7 The absence of
the theorization and acknowledgement of the inseparable linkages of
levels and, above all, the simultaneity and coequality of causal variables
located on these levels, it is not surprising that India’s regional power
status takes on an ambivalent status in the literature. There, it is, for in-
stance, sometimes described as ‘obvious’ and, sometimes, however,
7 One may even recognize a fourth level of analysis that may need to be integrated into a full
assessment of India’s regional power role and its linkages with these other levels: India’s
ambitions at the regional level beyond South Asia, such as its participation within ASEAN
or other instances of a deepening engagement with wider Asia. This, however, is beyond
the scope of this article, and a speciﬁc discussion of these instances is not likely to change
the core of the argument. Nevertheless, I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
drawing my attention to this.
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questioned due to its apparent ‘inability’ to provide stability and democ-
racy in the region (Mohan, 2007a; Destradi, 2008).
To illustrate the alternative argument made here, this paper uses two
cases of crisis management in South Asia, an issue area in which a re-
gional power, conventionally deﬁned, should pay great attention to.
Crises management, indeed, is an arena in which high expectations are
directed at regional powers. Various approaches, including hegemony
theories, that have stability and peace at their core raise the expectation
for India to support stability and democracy in the region for both ma-
terial and/or idealistic purposes. In the cases discussed here, Nepal’s
democracy crisis and Sri Lanka’s ethnic conﬂict, this did not happen.
They therefore constitute interesting cases for assessing the plausibility of
my argument.
4 India’s Nepal policy: failed states and the
promotion of democracy and stability
This ﬁrst example discusses India’s role during the political crisis in
Nepal between 2001 and 2006. The crisis began during the summer of
2001 with the assassination of almost the entire royal family by Prince
Dipendra. On this day, King Birendra, Queen Aiswarya, and the King’s
brother Dhirendra died. The crisis ended, at least temporarily, in 2006,
when mass protests forced King Gyandendra to resign. Of particular
interest is how India reacted to this process of destabilization in its im-
mediate neighborhood. This study thus speciﬁcally looks at the phase
ahead of the so-called ‘Royal Coup’ on 1 February 2005 during which
democracy and stability in Nepal were seriously damaged, and an escal-
ation of the Maoist insurgency was imminent.
India’s relatively low proﬁle is surprising, when we consider that, histor-
ically, it has often tried to exert inﬂuence in Nepal on its foreign policy
and its relations with China in particular (Bhasin, 2005; Mohan, 2007b;
Nayak, 2009). Friendship and trade agreements in various forms have
been implemented since 1950. Likewise, India attempted to manipulate
different aspects of Nepal’s domestic policy more or less successfully.8
8 An important event was, for instance, the end of the Rama regime in 1951, which India
triggered through the ‘Delhi-compromise’ (for a more detailed description see Ashtana,
1999, p. 100ff.). Almost all Nepalese governments have attempted to instrumentalize the re-
lation with India for securing their own political survival. The creation of an anti-Indian
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The relevance of Nepal’s internal developments for India increased with
the onset of the ‘People’s War’ of the Nepalese Maoist Movement on 13
February 1996, mainly, but not only, because of India’s own struggles
with Maoist rebels. Indeed, Prime Minister (PM) Manmohan Singh re-
peatedly deﬁned the insurgency of the so-called ‘Naxalites’ as India’s
major security threats (Ramesh, 2006; The Economist, 2006; Gupta,
2007).
After the assassination of the King, Prince Gyandendra, who was
probably the most unpopular member of the Royal family, took over the
Nepalese throne in June 2001 (Crossette, 2005, p. 71). While previous
Nepalese governments have been reluctant to use military force to
combat the Maoists, King Gyanendra initiated military attacks in pro-
vinces controlled by the Maoists, which killed nearly 13 000 people,
above all civilians (Cottle and Keys, 2007, p. 172). Moreover, during this
critical period, the King gave the order to arrest numerous politicians
and party leaders on 1 February 2005 (Ganguly and Shoup, 2005,
p. 129). He himself took over all government business, with the alleged
objective to restore multiparty democracy. The King’s grip to complete
the power was completed by the proclamation of a state of emergency.
Constitutional freedoms were constrained by this move, and all telephone
and internet connections were disrupted as well as all air ﬂights to other
countries. On 10 February, the King appointed a Council consisting of
10 Ministers under his own chairmanship and declared that he would
reign for at least three years or until peace and democracy were restored.
As a reaction, the seven opposition parties founded an alliance (the
Seven Party Alliance), supported by the Maoists. This alliance staged
mass protests and demanded the end of the monarchy in Nepal
(Destradi, 2012). Finally, in April 2006, it succeeded in forcing the King
to reinstate Parliament. At the same time, the Maoists continued their
violent ﬁght until a ceaseﬁre was agreed in June 2006.
India’s reaction to these developments can be summarized as follows.
Initially, the government attempted to mediate between the three conﬂict-
ing parties: the monarchy, political parties, and the Maoists. In November
2005, India played an important role in negotiations between the Seven
Party Alliance and the Maoists, which ultimately led to an agreement
atmosphere was deemed necessary for the establishment of a stronger basis of Nepalese na-
tionalism, which in turn guaranteed a certain regime stability (Upreti, 2006, p. 262).
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about the necessity of ending monarchy and the subsequent proclamation
of a Nepalese Republic. Yet, at the same time, the Indian government
only exerted very moderate pressure on the ofﬁcial head of state, King
Gynandendra, to end his infringements of democracy. For instance,
Special Envoy Dr Karan Singh was dispatched in early 2006 to ‘talk sense
to a monarch intent on hiding from the anger of his people behind the
guns of the RNA’ (Royal Nepalese Army) (Hilton, 2006). The talks culmi-
nated in the relatively meager offer by the King, on 21 April 2006, to
hand over some power to a PM and a new Council of Ministers. The deal
failed to accommodate the key demands of the Nepalese opposition, such
as the reinstatement of Parliament and the withdrawal of the King’s
control over the army. India’s immediate welcome for the King’s offer
caused great irritation among the democratic movement in Nepal (ibid.).
Such deviation from the projection of India’s own democratic principles
has also raised doubts about India’s willingness and/or capacities for hege-
monic projection in South Asia.
I wish I could make out India’s policy on its neighbors. At best, it is a
reaction to what they do or not do. Where we have exposed ourselves
the most is in Nepal […]. Do we want the king or not? We cannot
make up our mind (Nayar, 2006).9
Indeed, one could argue that the Indian government was probably more
concerned about a possible spillover effects of a Maoist takeover in
Nepal on the Naxalite insurgencies in its own country than about a pos-
sible end of the democratic movement in the mountain kingdom (Cottle
and Keys, 2007, p. 173, Malone 2011, p. 117). Instead, India has been
willing to support the traditional two-pillar structure of constitutional
monarchy and multiparty democracy, which characterized the Nepal’s
political system for a long time as long as this guaranteed the continued
exclusion of Maoists from the political process.10
The Maoists’ success in the democratic elections of 2008, which were
generally considered fair and free, suggests in fact that India struggles to
9 Kuldip Nayar is a former member of the Rajya Sabha.
10 The following statement made in the Rajya Sabha supports this argument: ‘India has con-
sistently held the view that the problems confronting Nepal, including the Maoist insur-
gency, can be addressed effectively only on the basis of a national consensus between the
two constitutional forces, namely multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy’
(Rajya Sabha, 2005).
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reach its goals in South Asia. As it was said above, outcomes such as
these are, understandably, often characterized as failures in need for ex-
planation. The main contender as explanations in the existing literature
is a ‘lack of followership’ by neighboring states, such as Nepal. This
ﬁnding, in the case at hand, is underpinned by evidence derived from
anti-Indian statements in Nepalese media and anti-Indian statements by
some Nepali government members (DeVotta, 2003; Destradi, 2008). Yet,
a closer look at the methods used to pinpoint a lack of followership
reveals the potentially weak foundations of this claim.
First of all, the argumentation is often tautological. This is the case
when a lack of followership is used to explain the India’s lack of inﬂuence
and, at the same time, the absence of followers serves as measurement of
this lack of inﬂuence. Aside this methodological argument, three other
substantial points can be raised: the lack of followership is determined
by fairly superﬁcial criteria, such as the occurrence of anti-Indian media
reports. While this is, of course at least partly, a useful indicator, it
neglects the deep and historically founded links between the two states
and its people and the manifold expectations cast upon India by Nepal
as a consequence of these geographical, historical, ethnic, and cultural
interconnections. It is argued here that these profound expectations over-
ride the rhetorical, but, at their core, ineffectual resistance to Indian
leadership. Instead, it is argued that anti-Indian demonstrations are
motivated by the conviction that ‘after all, India will help Nepal. They
think it is their right to get help from India – and they don’t have any
duty to be friendlier to India’ (ibid.).11 The awareness of India’s size and
its opportunities for inﬂuencing most aspects of Nepalese existence is
thus a core aspect of Nepalese–Indian relations. They also, arguably,
constitute the reasons for why all three core parties to the conﬂict agreed
that India could and needed to play a signiﬁcant role in mediating nego-
tiations among themselves. It is thus justiﬁable to come to the conclusion
that at least signiﬁcant shares of Nepalese society and its political elites
accept Indian predominance. From this acceptance, expectations about
India’s role arise, regardless of its (un)willingness to fulﬁll these
obligations.
11 ‘For most Nepalese, India is a land of opportunity, where they ﬁnd employment whether in
the army, paramilitary, or police forces or as simple workers. For the young Nepalese, it is
a lend where endless opportunities for higher education open up’. (Bhasin, 2005, p. liii).
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The second and more serious objection refers of the evaluation of
India’s role in the region with the help of benchmarks that are not neces-
sarily representative of the priorities exposed in Indian foreign policy-
making. In other words, measuring India’s inﬂuence in terms of goals
that are of no particular interest to this country seems ﬂawed. More con-
cretely, India’s main interest de facto does not seem to be an in-depth en-
gagement with the problems of its smaller neighboring states. Instead,
avoiding a spillover of crises such as in Nepal seems to be at the top of
the list of priorities (Ashtana, 1999, p. 2; Muni, 2009; Malone, 2011,
p. 118). The South Asian neighborhood is thus primarily regarded as a
main source of threat to Indian stability and, by extension, it is consid-
ered a major obstacle in the pursuit of global status.12 Thus, internal dy-
namics – in this case the concern of rising internal instability through a
Maoist threat in its own territory – need to be taken much more serious-
ly in an assessment of India’s goals and preferences.13 In this research, I
argue that Indian claims about its interest in a peaceful and ﬂourishing
Nepal need to be interpreted in this light. A stable Nepal does not neces-
sarily imply a democratic Nepal; an insight, which might make much of
Indian policy-making between 2001 and 2006 a lot more understandable.
Seen from this light, the absence of a democratization ‘plan’ for South
Asia appears as a well-planned and deliberate strategy, rather than a puz-
zling omission. Indeed, it can be demonstrated that India has a strong
foreign policy preference in pursuing its ‘appropriate place’ (Ministry of
External Affairs, 2001) in the world, and that the manifold trouble spots
of South Asia are, for at least two reasons, generally viewed as
12 The pursuit of global status and an aspiration for major power status is among the central
guiding principles of Indian policy-making since independence (Cohen, 2001, p. 62f.). This
citation from Indian former PM I.K. Gujral entails the core and background of this aspir-
ation, which shines through many – if not all – of India’s foreign policy acts: ‘To under-
stand India’s goals and aspirations, and her eventual destiny, one must consider the
currents of history that have shaped here and molded her character. India, for the largest
part of her history […], has been a living thriving civilization […]. Ideas and ideologies,
any many of the world’s great religions, have originated in the fertile soil of India to be pro-
pagated far beyond its shores. Scientiﬁc learning, statecraft, the arts, ﬂourished as did all
manner of economic activity […]. This tradition, this history has gifted India, even in
the lessened circumstances of today, with a global vision and a holistic view (Gujral,
2004, p. 2)’. There is thus a ‘sense of entitlement’ for global stature and recognition that –
colloquially – seems to make the region a fairly ‘unsatisfactory’ arena to play in.
13 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making me emphasize this vital point even
more.
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unnecessary obstacles in the pursuit of this goal. First, the vulnerability
of the region has a negative effect on the status and reputation of India
as a responsible regional power. Secondly, these conﬂicts consume im-
portant ﬁnancial and personal resources, which otherwise could be used
to pursue other foreign policy that aims outside South Asia (Ganguly,
2006).
If we take embeddedness seriously, a third argument can be made to
show the inaccuracy of simply assessing India as a ‘failed’ regional power
that lacks inﬂuence in Nepal. The next section will show that India
indeed fulﬁlled a core interest by taking a rather ‘symbolic’ stance in the
Nepalese state crises as it was able to both enhance its international
proﬁle by collaborating with international actors while at the same time
reducing the costs of its engagement signiﬁcantly. With regard to the ﬁrst
aspect, the achievement of international recognition, we ﬁrst need to
consider the interests of India in South Asia as well as the perceptions of
India by the relevant external actors. The most important external actors
for Nepal are the United States, the EU and its member states, and
Japan, which provide development aid, as well as China, which is a
direct neighbor to Nepal and main rival to India. During the Cold War
as well as during most of the 1990s, Nepal’s interactions with external
actors were limited to one between donors and recipient of development
aid. Hence, the deteriorating political and social situation in the country
received relatively little attention (Khadka, 1997). This dynamic shifted
with the events on 9/11 as it was feared that a failed Nepal could
become a safe haven for ‘international terrorism’. Nepal’s appearance on
the international agenda has been reﬂected by a multitude of high-rank
state visits in quick successes between 2002 and 2004. The former US
foreign minister Colin Powell visited Nepal in the beginning of 2002,
offering the Nepalese government military and economic aid for combat-
ing the Maoist insurgency (Thapliyal, 2006, p. 51). A Donor Conference
convened to discuss measures by which to avoid state failure in Nepal
was held in London on 18th and 19th June 2002. The attendees –
Australia, China, India, Russia, the United States, and several European
States – rallied around the notion that ‘Nepal’s struggle against Maoist
insurgents should be seen as part of the wider war against terrorism’
(BBC News, 2002). Moreover, military aid from the UK was boosted
from a mere £700, 000 in 2001 to £7million in 2002. The United States
gave military and security assistance to Nepal worth US $17 million in
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2003 in order to enhance Nepal’s ability to cooperate in the global ﬁght
against terrorism (Kronstadt, 2003, p. 3).
The royal coup of 1 February 2005 forced international actors to
rethink their strategies. Almost in unison, foreign governments con-
demned the power grab by King Gyanendra (European Union, 2005;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005; US Department of State,
2005). Whereas the United States held back from punitive actions, the
governments in London and New Delhi imposed sanctions on the ﬂow
of military hardware (The Washington Times, 2005). Overall, however,
the concern that Maoist domination would lead to greater destabilization
in the region prevailed over concerns about authoritarian rule by the
Nepalese monarch (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006). China
considered the coup a domestic affair and, despite their potential ideo-
logical solidarity with the Maoists, the Chinese Government consistently
denied any contact with the Nepalese rebels (The Economist, 2006).
Consensus at the international level precipitated the additional involve-
ment of the UN. The ﬁrst step was made with the establishment of an
ofﬁce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Kathmandu
in May 2005, addressing the human rights situation involving abuses
from both Maoists and Nepal’s security forces. Following this, in
January 2007, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) came to support the
peace process and to prepare for free and fair elections (Crossette, 2005,
p. 73; United Nations Mission in Nepal, 2008).
The perceptions of external actors about India and its role in South
Asia also changed over the course of the 1990s. During the early 1990s,
India was regarded as the ‘estranged democracy’, particularly in the
United States. However, its unexpected entry into the league of nuclear
powers in 1998, as well as its spectacular economic growth, made it a
more credible contender for a place among the great powers. This has
also impacted on the expectations placed on India with regard to its ‘re-
sponsibilities’ in South Asia. The increasing convergence of Indian inter-
ests with those of the United States and other external actors, China
aside, over the need to stabilize Nepal certainly helped India to gain
acknowledgement as a key regional actor. This led to a new phase of
substantial political cooperation (Mohan, 2007a, p. 110). Donald Camp,
Principal Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of South Asian Affairs at the
US Department of State, in 2005, stated that:
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India, in our view, plays an absolutely crucial role in all of this. India,
as far as Nepal is concerned, is the major power. The United States is
far away. India is right next door. India has the most inﬂuence and the
most leverage on this situation (US Department of State, 2005).
Similarly, the European Parliament acknowledged India’s primary pos-
ition in both of its resolutions on the situation in Nepal in 2003 and
2006 (European Parliament, 2003, 2006), and it particularly praised
Indian efforts to persuade the King to restore multiparty democracy and
civil liberties. India, hence, was clearly regarded as the responsible, and
maybe even accountable, actor when it came to ﬁnding a solution to the
crisis in Nepal (US Department of State, 2005, 2006, 2009; US
Government Printing Ofﬁce, 2005). Its dominant role in the region is
reinforced by such acknowledgement: The United States, the EU, and
Japan all coordinated their Nepal policies with India, which reﬂected
positively on its global reputation and allowed, for instance, to contribute
to global decision-making, such as during the London Donor
Conference of 2002. This would probably not have been possible during
the 1990s.
These processes were facilitated by the way in which the Indian gov-
ernment adjusted its stance toward the activities of external actors in the
region in the past decade. Previously, almost all external interventions in
regional conﬂicts had been rejected with vigor. The Indira doctrine14
and to a certain degree the Gujral doctrine15 are representative of this
attitude. In these foreign policy doctrines, South Asia was presented as
the exclusive sphere of India’s inﬂuence. In the case of Nepal, this, in
particular, referred to limiting China’s inﬂuence:
India considers Nepal a country of direct and vital importance for its
security and strategic interests, and therefore would like to ensure that
14 The Indira Doctrine was considered as an unofﬁcial, yet well-known guideline for India’s
foreign policy, which has been developed by the administration of PM Indira Ghandi. One
of the guidelines has been that India promised to stay out of the internal affairs of its
neighboring states, yet, in return, would not tolerate any external interventions within the
region. In times of crisis, India ought to be asked for help. Hence, this doctrine is often
described as the Monroe-Doctrine of South Asia (Rao, 1985, p. 63).
15 Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral shaped these inofﬁcial guidelines in 1996, which said India
will be generous toward its neighboring states on political and economic grounds. This was
bound to the expectation that the neighboring states would not to allow for their territories
to be used for activities harming other states within South Asia (Murthy, 2000, p. 71ff.).
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no other power exerts so much inﬂuence that Indo-Nepal relations
might be jeopardised (Khadka, 1997,p. 1060).
In the past decade, this notion changed due to its economic and
military-technological successes and the resulting enhanced self-
consciousness in the international scene and a more status-oriented
foreign policy outlook. Moreover, India appears to have engaged in an
attempt to reduce the costs incurred by crises in the region. In other
words, the strategy of blockading and rejecting external actors has been
replaced by a strategy of cooperation, especially in ﬁelds that promise to
enhance the stability of the region (Singh, 2005). For instance, the pres-
ence of international organizations in Nepal has been welcomed by the
Indian government. Cooperation with the United States has been
described by a member of the Indian government as follows:
We do what we think is best at the moment, and co-operation with
the United States is the demand of the time. Last year [2005] we were
working closely together and there was much consultation and it is a
normal practice for them to ask us and for us to tell them.16
Overall, at least some Indian activism, with regard to the crisis in Nepal,
can be interpreted as symbolic gestures targeted at the international com-
munity, to portray India as a responsible member of this community.
Showing responsibility for the region has, in this vein, also become an in-
strument for the achievement of global goals, without, as such, being the
actual objective of Indian foreign policy endeavors. This is an interpret-
ation that is hard to capture and pursue with established theories and
approaches that are conventionally used for the analysis of regional
power strategies. The following evaluation made by a member of the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs illustrates that this approach is not
only a phenomenon that is valid for Nepal:
There is no doubt that unless we do a good job in managing our
neighbourhood that this has an impact on how we are seen in the
world. So this would circumscribe our global role whether we wanted
16 Interview with a government ofﬁcial on, New Delhi, 28 November 2006. A concrete
example for this joint coordination is the mediation of talks between the Maoists and the
Seven Party Alliance in November 2005.
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it or not. Better relations [in the region] would enhance our
credibility.17
This pragmatic approach to its own regional role is one of the main
reasons why India, despite an interest in principle in a speciﬁc outcome
to the conﬂict, neither used its own material advantages nor built on the
support expressed by the international community, to signiﬁcantly
impact on events in Nepal, in particular between 2001 and 2006. Its
rather narrow interpretation of its own interests in the Himalayan state
have, from the perspective presented here, prevented a more comprehen-
sive engagement for democracy and stability in the region. This has been
apparent during the crisis itself, but also during the time period ahead of
it, which was characterized by a gradual dismantling of democratic struc-
tures. Instead, rather ‘symbolic’ steps have been taken, for instance, in
the form of coordinating international actors that mainly contribute to
two objectives: ﬁrst, to minimize costs incurred to India, and while at the
same time, second, to be perceived as a good international citizen. To de-
scribe this strategy as a failure, and to equate a lack of followership with
a lack of inﬂuence, thus seems at least questionable.
5 Sri Lanka’s crisis in April and May 2000: India
as a global or regional peacekeeper?
The historic shift of India’s South Asian policy from the implementation
of the Indira doctrine to the current ‘hyperpragmatism’ is also reﬂected
in its relations to Sri Lanka in general and the Indian engagement
(or rather nonengagement) in the ethnic conﬂict between the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Singhalese majority government
in particular. While India did intervene in 1987 by dispatching the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka – even if with very
little success,18 the following years were coined by much restraint and
17 Interview with the former government ofﬁcial on, New Delhi 7 December 2006.
18 The IPKF has been stationed in Sri Lanka in order to monitor the disarmament of the
LTTE after the violent phase of the conﬂict in 1987. At the same time, the Sri Lankan
army was deployed in the South of the country in order to oppress a looming Singhalese
insurgency (Pfaffenberger, 1988). The task of the IPKF was to disarm the LTTE, but they
were quickly involved in violent quarrels with the rebels. The failure can be linked to a lack
of intelligence and the poor preparation of the Indian army. This operation is considered
the ‘longest war’ in which India was involved and, at times, 70,000 Indian soldiers were sta-
tioned in Sri Lanka and of which >1100 were killed. After three years, the IPKF was
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reservation, despite regular escalations of violence in the island state.
This again challenges the assumption that regional powers are necessar-
ily interested in a hegemonic position within their own region. Hence,
this also calls into question the way in which the notion of regional
power ‘failure’ is entertained in the literature.
The case study in particular looks at the events in 2000, as this
year provides a rather extreme, and hence useful, test case for ‘regional
leadership’, understood in the conventional way. On 21 April 2000, the
unthinkable happened. The LTTE recaptured the Elephant Pass, the
decisive land route that links the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland of
Sri Lanka. This capture was followed by weeks of intense battle between
the LTTE and Sri Lankan forces. Soon, the Tigers threatened to capture
the Northern Palay Airstrip and with it the entire peninsula, where
approximately 40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers were stationed, and in danger
of being overrun by the rebel group (Mehta, 2000, p. 11; Sambandan,
2000). In response, Sri Lanka appealed to ‘friendly countries’ for
support in a conﬂict that it had previously considered an exclusively in-
ternal issue (Government of Sri Lanka, 2000). Even the more nationalis-
tic and anti-Indian elements in the Sri Lankan political regime agreed
with this plea by their government. Yet India, under the Government
of PM Vajpayee, rejected outright their request to provide military aid to
save the Sri Lankan troops. Instead, it ‘continued to abide by its hands-
off policy of recent years’ (Government of Sri Lanka, 2000; Sambandan,
2000; Dixit, 2001, p. 272f.).
This position was vigorously debated in the academic literature and
the media. Support was lent to the Indian stance by some who believed
that peace negotiations in Sri Lanka were only possible if India stayed at
the sidelines (Crossette, 2002, p. 25). Yet, others argued that no credible
commitments to peace and negotiations could be made without India.
Thus, they accused India of having let down the Government and people
of Sri Lanka (DeVotta, 2003, p. 375). Eventually, in mid-June of 2000,
the Sri Lankan Government ended the Tigers’ string of victories, at least
temporarily. The army was bolstered by military assistance from Israel,
rather than India, who supplied arms to match the Tigers’ initially super-
ior weaponry (The Economist, 2000). Later that year, both sides in the
forced to withdraw by the Sri Lankan PM (for more details, see Dugger, 2000; also: Rao,
1988; Rupesinghe, 1988; Hagerty, 1991; Muni, 1993; Bullion, 1995; Bhasin, 2001).
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conﬂict accepted a ceaseﬁre brokered by Norway (Steele, 2004). Violent
confrontations continued despite the agreement. When the ceaseﬁre of
2003 began to crumble and violence was on the rise, President
Rajapakse asked the Government of India in December 2006 to co-chair
the peace process. However, India declined again (Panneerselvan, 2006,
p. 25; Saran, 2006).19
This pattern of restraint raises questions about the India’s ability or
willingness to provide stability and order in South Asia. Bemusement
among observers is further created by the fact that, in the case of Sri
Lanka, a more active engagement could have helped India to pursue
some of its own vital interests. For instance, this would have aided terms
of regulating the stream of refugees from Sri Lanka to the Indian state of
Tamil Nadu. India’s reluctance to actively engage in the conﬂict is fre-
quently explained by pointing at its negative experiences incurred during
the days of the IPKF, from 1987 to 1989. Moreover, observers highlight
the trauma caused by the assassination of Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi,
who was killed during an election campaign in 1992 by Tamil terrorists.
DeVotta argues that, in addition, domestic restrictions and the over-
stretch of India’s military by the Kashmir conﬂict and insurgencies in
the North-East of the country are factors that limited India’s scope for
action. All of these factors certainly play a role in explaining the ‘puzzle’
of Indian Sri Lanka policy. Despite that, it is argued here that Indian
‘nonengagement’ should again not be directly equated with a perplexing
‘failure’ or ‘inability’ to engage for stability and peace in the region.
Instead, it seems plausible that India’s apparent indifference20 toward
the region overshadowed the more typical regional power motivations of
either ‘threat’ or ‘responsibility’. This can be illustrated with the help of
several points, ﬁrst among them the virtual nonexistence of an Indian
19 The Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE drifted into an ‘undeclared war’ after the ex-
plosion of a bus on 15 June 2006. Norwegian mediators suspended the peace talks, and the
LTTE was added to the list of banned terrorist groups by the EU. Earlier in 2005, the Sri
Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar was assassinated.
20 In the absence of a better word, ‘apparent indifference’ is used here to describe that – while
India is acutely aware of its regional context and the impact it may have on its own domes-
tic situation – it does not appear willing to bear signiﬁcant costs to ensure that its desired
outcomes are in fact achieved. Instead, it rather relies on outside actors to do so. This, ob-
viously, is linked with signiﬁcant risks – for instance, with regard to an increased Chinese
inﬂuence in South Asia. Yet, this seems to be a risk that India is ready to take a chance on
and , thus, some degree of ‘indifference’ can indeed be detected.
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regional security and peacekeeping policy. Unlike most other countries,
there is neither documented strategy or visible outline of policy prefer-
ences in this issue area, nor could, at least in recent years, a discourse on
when, how, and why to engage in any form of military and nonmilitary
peacekeeping operation be detected among Indian policy-makers or the
wider foreign and military policy elite. This stands in sharp contrast with
India’s growing engagement in UN peace-missions (Bullion, 2005,
p. 198f.). A strong presence within the UN and in particular in the ﬁeld
of peacekeeping seems more highly valued.
India has been aware of her responsibilities and has consistently con-
tributed to some 30 UN peacekeeping efforts. An emerging power gives
indications of aspirations in many ways. A strong presence in UN mis-
sions is one of them. The activity, besides being noble, signiﬁes a nation’s
destiny and capacity to play its part in world affairs (Major General
V.K. Shrivastava in Bullion, 2005, p. 206). The perception of apparent
regional indifference is heightened by India’s rejection of the Sri Lankan
government’s overt and active demand for Indian support. As such, the
absence of this support can thus clearly not be explained by pointing at
a lack of acceptance or legitimacy.21
A second point to be advanced in favor of the arguments presented
here is that India’s attitude toward external intervention in other South
Asian countries shifted signiﬁcantly, a point which is clearly observable
in the case of Sri Lanka. During the 1980s, external actors have been
regarded as potentially destabilizing factors in the conﬂict, especially
when it comes to the United States. Thus, the intervention of the IPKF
in 1987 has often been interpreted as a means to obstruct the involve-
ment of the United States and China. However, it also constitutes a
good example of the ‘Indira doctrine’ in practice (ibid.). Since the
mid-1990s, and particularly in 2000, rather than intervening in or at least
militarily and politically supporting Sri Lanka, India encouraged
Norwegian mediation and allowed actors, such as Israel and even China,
to provide military supplies to the Sri Lankan troops. In addition, the
21 The Sri Lanka attitude is well captured in this quotation: ‘in the mid-1990s, the political
leadership of Sri Lanka realized that India could be seen as an asset, and this also
inﬂuenced the view of the larger public. Previously, an anti-Indian image was built up by
politicians. Now, there is an expectation that India would actually help to guarantee the
unity of the country’ (Expert interview on, New Delhi, 9 November 2006). Similar in:
Wickremesinghe (2006, p. 9).
India and South Asia in the world Page 23 of 33
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
United States were explicitly recognized as a ‘stabilizing force’, which
pursued the same interests as India (Daily News, 2000b; Mohan, 2002,
p. 154; Venkataramanan, 2006, p. 25). This behavior could, on the one
hand, be interpreted as an Indian failure in performing its ‘role’ as a re-
gional power. On the other hand, India again has been mainly interested
in minimizing its own engagement and the costs arising from it. In turn,
India was willing to grant other actors like the United States or China
with more scope in Sri Lanka. Hence, the conclusion that India ‘failed’
by engaging in this type of behavior may indeed be misguided.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that, despite its off-hand
policy, India’s size and status on a regional and global scale nevertheless
guaranteed that it was regarded as a key actor in the Sri Lankan crisis.
This dynamic, in turn, constitutes a pattern that could already have been
observed in the case study of Nepal. Even if India openly refused to play
‘its part’ in mediating or even ending the conﬂict, it remained the ‘key
partner’ of virtually all external actors that engaged in conﬂict manage-
ment in Sri Lanka, above all the EU, Japan, Norway, and the United
States. All of these players have continued to emphasize that India is
central to any peace process in Sri Lanka (International Crisis Group,
2008; Swamy, 2006). A statement by the Assistant Secretary of State
for South Asian Affairs (2000) reads as follows: ‘We believe that India is
the key outside power and that any action taken by the international
community must include India’ (Daily News, 2000a).
In summary, at the conceptual level, the two case studies have shown
that the arguments made here, about the need for considering ‘embed-
dedness’ and its consequences as a factor in regional power politics are,
at least, plausible. Throughout the last decade, the presence of external
actors in South Asia has been tolerated by India and at times even ac-
tively sought. A result of this change is that India assigns less-and-less
signiﬁcance to its own role in regional conﬂict prevention, but also
within other issue areas. India’s foreign policy thus experienced a shift in
priorities from the regional to the global level, which is crucial for
explaining its South Asian policies. This approach could be described as
‘cautious pragmatism’, which involves that India’s attitude toward the
region is characterized by a lack of dedication rather than by a yet to be
deﬁned hegemonic leadership ambitions. This quote by a government
ofﬁcial is representative:
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India has been straight-jacketed in South Asia for much too long.
Today the Indian economy is global and India’s inﬂuence is also
global in strategic and economic terms. And as an emerging global
player India has to get out of the jacket.22
A key to these ﬁndings is that India appears to lack the interest to deal
with region or to even generate the followership that is so frequently
assumed to be an essential part of regional powerhood. Dubey describes
this as follows:
[We] believe that if there is a problem, then we as a major power,
beyond a point, are not going to suffer from these problems. The ten-
dency is to let the problems simmer because it is [sic] our neighbours
who suffer (Dubey, 2000, p. 7).
More recent attempts to formulate a coherent neighbor policy, as mani-
fested in two prominent speeches by then Indian Foreign Secretary
Shyam Saran in 2005 and 2006, have often been interpreted, especially
by the neighboring states, as an expression of hyperpragmatism that
characterizes India’s South Asia policy (Saran, 2005, 2006). The reluc-
tance to engage in a ‘hegemonic’ or benevolent way with the challenges
that its neighboring states struggles with has been conﬁrmed in state-
ments and interviews with members of the Indian government.23 This in-
terpretation of India’s regional policy thus stands in contrast with
analyses that explain India’s regional role as a result of nonexistent fol-
lowership and/or leadership. The article has even shown that India does
not necessarily lack followership. Instead, both Nepal and Sri Lanka
have actively sought out Indian involvement! Lastly, to simply link the
apparent lack of Indian inﬂuence in South Asia to the refusal of smaller
neighboring states to follow puts too strong an emphasis on the ability of
these states to determine the effectiveness of India’s role in the region.
This, I hope to have shown, ‘disempowers’ India in an unconvincing
manner.
22 Interview with the former government ofﬁcial on, New Delhi, 21 November 2006.
23 Expert interviews on, New Delhi, 7 November 2006 and 15 November 2006; see also
Bhasin, 2005, p. li.
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6 Conclusion
This article primarily served to introduce and illustrate the existence and
signiﬁcance of the embeddedness of regions into the international
system. It used two case studies of Indian foreign policy within its
regions that previously have caused signiﬁcant bemusement among
scholars and politicians alike. It has been demonstrated that this embed-
dedness creates theoretical and conceptional tensions, which cannot be
resolved by falling back to conventional theories. Typically ‘global’ the-
ories, such as the manifold theories of hegemony, are challenged by their
inability to capture what it means to act on a regional level that is inte-
grated into a broader world system. ‘Regional theories’, in particular
those dealing with regional integration processes, limit the theorization
of embeddedness as well, by reducing to an analysis of the potential
impact of external actors onto regional dynamics. If we apply such theor-
ies to regional powers, it consequently makes us to assume that regional
powers always and automatically have to defend an inherent interest in
the region against incursions of external actors.
Instead, it is argued here that there is no such single pattern of behav-
ior, that there also is no determinism how regional powers should be
expected to behave, and that we simultaneously need to capture the
mutual interactions between the global and regional levels. These two
levels cannot be considered independent of each other. This implies that
regional powers can become active on the global level, sometimes as a
representative of the region and at other times as an independent player
with interests that might counteract those of the region as a whole. This
is not to neglect many other factors, in the case of India, particularly in-
ternal dynamics that guide foreign policy-making. The aim of this article
was to complement this large and useful existing literature with an argu-
ment that can make some of our theoretical work more sophisticated
and more applicable to the ‘real world’.
As the presented case studies show that the embeddedness of the
South Asian region into the international system has indeed an impact
on the type of regional power role India is playing. While the provided
empirical examples have been limited to essentially two exemplary case
studies, they nevertheless showed that, in both instances, global factors
played into regional affairs and, above all, into India’s regional strategiz-
ing. It further seems feasible to reproduce a similar approach for other
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‘regional powers’. South Africa, for instance, equally has to balance its
ambition to be a ‘global player’ with the requirements of its regional
role. This is exempliﬁed by its rather ambivalent stance on state failure in
Zimbabwe, when it needed to reconcile Southern African demands for
regional solidarity with its global aspirations as a responsible inter-
national citizen (Prys, 2009). Likewise, it could be questioned in how far
states such as Brazil, Australia, or Russia locate themselves in between
the poles of regional and global foreign policy objectives. Focusing on
the ‘embeddedness’ of regions thus opens up a research agenda that may
lead to a better understanding of the role of regional powers in their
regions and the world.
Acknowledgements
I thank Nadine Godehardt and Joachim Betz for the valued contribu-
tions to this article. Moreover, the comments of three anonymous
reviewers have been extremely helpful in improving the argument and
presentation of the manuscript. Any remaining errors are, of course,
entirely my own.
References
Acharya, A. and Johnston, A.I. (eds) (2007) Crafting Cooperation: Regional
International Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Adler, E. and Greve, P. (2009) ‘When Security Community Meets Balance of
Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance’, Review
of International Studies, 35, 59–84.
Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. (2007) ‘Beyond the territorial ﬁx: regional assem-
blages, politics and power’, Regional Studies, 41, 1161–1175.
Ashtana, V. (1999) India’s Foreign Policy and Subcontinental Politics.
New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers.
Ayoob, M. (1989) ‘India in South Asia: the quest for regional dominance’,
World Policy Journal, 7, 110–131.
Ayoob, M. (1999) ‘From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key
Variables in the Construction of Regional Order’, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 53(3), 247–260.
Bajpai, K. (2010) ‘India and the world: the grand strategy debate’, in N. Jayal
and P.B. Mehta (eds), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, pp. 533–551.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
India and South Asia in the world Page 27 of 33
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
BBC News. (2002), ‘UK Urges Military Aid for Nepal’. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/south_asia/2054866.stm (19 June 2002), Retrieved 3 August 2008.
Behuria, A.K., Pattanaik, S.S. and Gupta, A. (2012) ‘Does India have a neigh-
bourhood policy?’, Strategic Analysis, 36(2), 229–246.
Bhasin, A.S. (2001) India-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conﬂict:
Documents, 1947–2000. New Delhi: Indian Research Press.
Bhasin, A.S. (2005) Nepal-India, Nepal-China Relations: Documents 1947-June
2005. New Delhi: Geetika Publishers.
Bullion, A.J. (1995) India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis, 1976–1994:
An International Perspective. London: Pinter.
Bullion, A.J. (2005) ‘India’, in D. Sorenson and P.C. Wood (eds), The Politics of
Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 196–212. Abingdon: Routledge.
Buzan, B. and Waever, O. (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure
of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Capling, A. and Nossal, K.R. (2009) ‘The contradictions of regionalism
in North America’, Review of International Studies, 35, 147–167.
Cohen, S. (2001) India: Emerging Power. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press.
Cottle, D. and Keys, A. (2007) ‘The Maoist conﬂict in Nepal: a himalayan per-
dition?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(2), 168–174.
Crossette, B. (2002) ‘Sri Lanka: in the shadow of the Indian Elephant’, World
Policy Journal, 19(1), 25–35.
Crossette, B. (2005) ‘Nepal: The politics of failure’, World Policy Journal, 22(4),
69–76.
Daily News. (2000a), ‘Lanka’s integrity reinforces India’s integrity’, 19 May
2000, Colombo.
Daily News. (2000b) ‘Norwegian team in India to DIscuss Sri Lankan issue’, 11
May 2000, Colombo.
Das, S.K. (2010) ‘India’s Look East Policy–Imagining a New Geography of
India’s Northeast’, India Quarterly, 66(4), 343–358.
de Lombaerde, P., Söderbaum, F. and van Langenhofe, L. et al. (2010) ‘The
problem of comparison in comparative regionalism’, Review of International
Studies, 36, 731–753.
Destradi, S. (2008) Empire, hegemony and leadership: developing a research
framework for the study of regional powers. Working Paper No. 79.
Hamburg: GIGA.
Destradi, S. (2012) ‘India as a democracy promoter? New Delhi’s involvement
in Nepal’s return to democracy’, Democratization, 19(2), 286–311.
DeVotta, N. (2003) ‘Is India overextended? When domestic order precludes re-
gional intervention’, Contemporary South Asia, 12(3), 365–380.
Page 28 of 33 Miriam Prys
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Dixit, J.N. (2001) India’s Foreign Policy and its Neighbours. New Delhi: Gyan
Publishing House.
Dubey, M. (2000) ‘India: outstanding achievements and dismal failure’, Politik
und Gesellschaft Online. [Retrieved 10 October 2006] available at http://www.
fes.de/IPG/ipg1_2000/Artdubey.html.
Dugger, C.W. (2000) ‘A Wary India Prepared to Step Back Into Sri Lanka’s
War’, New York Times, 25 May 2000, New York.
The Economist. (2000) ‘Another Bomb In the war’, 10 June, London, 89.
The Economist. (2006) ‘A Spectre Haunting India’, 17 August 2006, London, 79.
European Parliament. (2003) European Parliament Resolution on Nepal,
Strasbourg: European Parliament (P5_TA(2003)0468), 23 October 2003).
European Parliament. (2006) European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in
Nepal, Strasbourg: European Parliament (B6–0282/2006), 16 May 2006.
European Union. (2005) Declaration by the European Union on the Situation in
Nepal, Brussels: European Union Press 25 February 2005.
Flemes, D. and Wojczewski, T. (2010) Contested leadership in international rela-
tions: power politics in South America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
GIGAWorking Paper No. 121. Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global
and Area Studies.
Frankel, F.R. and Harding, H. (eds) (2004) The India-China Relationship:
Rivalry and Engagement. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Frazier, D. and Stewart-Ingersoll, R. (2010) ‘Regional powers and security: a
framework for understanding order within regional security complexes’,
European Journal of International Relations, 16, 731–753.
Ganguly, S. (2006) ‘Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise’, Foreign Affairs, 85(4),
45–56.
Ganguly, S. and Hagerty, D.T. (2005) Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises
in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Ganguly, S. and Shoup, B. (2005) ‘Nepal: between dictatorship and anarchy’,
Journal of Democracy, 16(4), 129–143.
Garver, J.M. (2001) Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Godehardt, N. and Nabers, D. (eds) (2011) Regional Powers and Regional
Orders. London: Routledge.
Government of Sri Lanka (2000) India rules out military assistance to
Sri Lanka. Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka, 4 May 2000.
Gujral, I. (2004) Viewpoint: Democracy, Civilisation and Foreign Policy.
New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
Gunatilleke, G. (2001) Negotiations for the Resolution of the Ethnic Conﬂict.
Colombo: Marga Institute.
India and South Asia in the world Page 29 of 33
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Gupta, D.K. (2007) ‘The Naxalites and the Maoist Movement in India: Birth,
Demise and Reincarnation’, Democracy and Security, 3(2), 157–188.
Hagerty, D.T. (1991) ‘India’s regional security doctrine’, Asian Survey, 31(4),
351–363.
Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. (2002) ‘Theorising the rise of regionness’, in
S. Breslin, C.W. Hughes, N. Phillips and B. Rosamund (eds), New
Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy. London: Routledge.
Hilton, I. (2006) ‘Standing behind the despot on the wrong side of history’, The
Guardian. 24 April 2006, London.
Hurrell, A. (1995) ‘Regionalism in theoretical perspective’, in L. Fawcett
and A. Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organizations
and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hurrell, A. (2005) ‘Hegemony and regional governance in the Americas’, in
L. Fawcett and M. Serrano (eds), Regionalism and Governance in the
Americas: Continental Drift. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ikenberry, G.J. and Kupchan, C.A. (1990) ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’,
International Organization, 44, 283–315.
International Crisis Group. (2008) Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the
Damage. Brussels: ICG.
Jaffrelot, C. (2003) ‘India’s look east policy: an asianist strategy in perspective’,
India Review, 2, 35–68.
Jordaan, E. (2003) ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations:
distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers’, Politikon,
30, 165–181.
Katzenstein, P.J. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American
Imperium. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Khadka, N. (1997) ‘Foreign aid to Nepal: donor motivations in the post-cold
war period’, Asian Survey, 37(11), 1044–1061.
Kronstadt, A.K. (2003) Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service.
Kubicek, P. (2009) ‘The commonwealth of independent states: an example for
failed regionalism?’, Review of International Studies, 35, 237–256.
Lake, D.A. and Morgan, P.M. (eds) (1997) Regional Orders: Building Security in
a New World. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Landsberg, C. (2004) ‘South Africa: a pivotal state in Africa’, Synopsis: Policy
Studies Bulletin, 7, 1–3.
Malik, M. (2006) China’s Strategy of Containing India. Chicago: Power and
Interest News Report, [Retrieved 20 June 2006] available at http://www.pinr.
com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=434&language_id=1.
Malone, D.M. (2011) Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Page 30 of 33 Miriam Prys
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Mehta, A. (2000) ‘A Long View from Delhi’, Himal. June, 10–12.
Ministry of External Affairs. (2001) Annual report 2000–2001. New Delhi: MEA.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2005) Statement by the press secretary on
the dismissal of the prime minister and the dissolution of the council of min-
isters by the Kingdom of Nepal. Tokyo: MFA, 2 February.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2006) Statement by the Press Secretary on
the Reinstatement of the House of Representatives in the Kingdom of Nepal.
Tokyo: MFA, 25 April.
Mitra, S.K. (2003) ‘The reluctant hegemon: India’s self-perception and the South
Asian strategic environment’, Contemporary South Asia, 12(3), 399–418.
Mohan, C.R. (2002) ‘A paradigm shift toward South Asia?’, Washington
Quarterly, 26(1), 141–155.
Mohan, C.R. (2007a) ‘Balancing interests and values: India’s struggle with dem-
ocracy promotion’, The Washington Quarterly, 30(3), 99–115.
Mohan, C.R. (2007b) ‘Soft borders and cooperative frontiers: India’s changing
territorial diplomacy towards Pakistan and China’, Strategic Analysis, 31,
1–23.
Mukherjee, R. and Malone, D.M. (2011) ‘Indian foreign policy and contemporary
security challenges’, International Affairs, 87(Nr. 1), 87–104. doi:10.1111/
j.1468-2346.2011.00961.x.
Muni, S.D. (1993) Pangs of Proximity: India’s and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis.
New Delhi: Sage.
Muni, S.D. (2009) India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension: with
Special Reference to Neighbours. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
Murthy, P. (2000) Managing Suspicions: Understanding India’s Relations with
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka. New Delhi: Knowledge World.
Nayar, K. (2006) ‘Schizophrenic Nepal Policy’, Nepali Times. 10–16 February
2006, Kathmandu.
Nayak, N. (2009) ‘Nepal: New “Strategic Partner” of China?’, IDSA Strategic
Comment (March), New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Nolte, D. (2010) ‘How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and
research topics’, Review of International Studies, 36, 881–901.
Østerud, Ø. (1992) ‘Regional great powers’, in I.B. Neumann (ed.), Regional
Great Powers in International Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
Panneerselvan, A.S. (2006) ‘The Forth Eelam War’, Himal, 19(4), 23–25.
Paul, T.V. (2006) ‘Why has the India-Pakistan rivalry been so enduring? Power
asymmetry and an intractable conﬂict’, Security Studies, 15(4), 600–630.
Pfaffenberger, B. (1988) ‘Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian intervention and the resur-
gence of the JVP’, Asian Survey, 28(2), 137–147.
India and South Asia in the world Page 31 of 33
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Prys, M. (2009) ‘Regional hegemon or regional bystander: South Africa’s
Zimbabwe policy 2000–2005’, Politikon: South African Journal of Political
Studies, 36(2), 193–218.
Prys, M. (2010) ‘Hegemony, domination, detachment: differences in regional
powerhood’, International Studies Review, 12(4), 479–504.
Prys, M. (2012) Redeﬁning Regional Power in International Relations: Indian and
South African perspectives. London: Routledge.
Rajya Sabha. (2005) Unstarred Question No 3772 Answered on 28 April 2005,
Rajya Sabha, New Delhi.
Ramesh, R. (2006) ‘Inside India’s Hidden War’, The Guardian. 9 May 2006,
London.
Rao, R.V. (1985) ‘Regional cooperation in South Asia’, The Round Table,
1(293), 60–72.
Rao, P.V. (1988) ‘Ethnic conﬂict in Sri Lanka: India’s role and perception’,
Asian Survey, 28(4), 419–436.
Rao, P.V. (2012) ‘South Asia’s retarded regionalism’, Journal of the Indian Ocean
Region, 8(1), 37–53. doi:10.1080/19480881.2012.683627.
Rupesinghe, K. (1988) ‘Ethnic conﬂicts in South Asia: the case of Sri Lanka
and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF)’, Journal of Peace Research,
25(4), 337–350.
Sambandan, V.S. (2000) ‘Advantage LTTE’, Frontline, 13–26 May 2000, Chennai.
Saran, S. (2005) India and Its Neighbours, Speech at the India International
Centre. New Delhi: MEA, 14 February 2005.
Saran, S. (2006) Does India have a Neighbourhood Policy? Talk by Foreign
Secretary at the Indian Council for World Affairs. New Delhi: ICWA,
9 September 2006.
Schoeman, M. (2003) ‘South Africa as an emerging middle power: 1994–2003’,
in J. Daniel, A. Habib and R. Southall (eds), State of the Nation: South
Africa, 2003–2004. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
Sharma, P., Adding Enemies, Outlook, 25 May 2009, 36.
Showstack Sassoon, A. (1982) ‘Hegemony, war of position and political
Intervention’, in A. Showstack Sassoon (ed.), Approaches to Gramsci.
London: Writers and Readers.
Singh, M. (2005) Prime Minister’s Speech at the India Today Enclave.
New Delhi: Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, 25 February 2005.
Sridharan, E. (2005) ‘International relations theory and the India-Pakistan con-
ﬂict’, India Review, 4(2), 103–123.
Steele, J. (2004) ‘Talking with tigers’, The Guardian, 17 December, London.
Stephen, M.D. (2012) ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: the
foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society,
26(3), 289–309.
Page 32 of 33 Miriam Prys
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Swamy, M.N. (2006) ‘India Not Too Keen to Up its Sri Lanka Proﬁle’, South
Asia Monitor. [Retrieved 26 May 2008] available at http://www.
southasianmonitor.org/2006/may/news/lanka1.shtml.
Thapliyal, S. (2006) ‘Nepal at the political crossroads: options for India’, South
Asian Survey, 13(1), 51–72.
United Nations Mission in Nepal. (2008) ‘About UNMIN’, Kathmandu:
UNMIN, [Retrieved 10 May 2008] available at http://www.unmin.org.np/?
d=about&p=mandate.
Upreti, B. (2006) ‘The Maoist insurgency in Nepal: nature, growth and impact’,
South Asian Survey, 13(1), 35–50.
US Department of State (2005) Press Conference in Nepal with Christina Rocca,
Assistant Secretary for South Asia. Kathmandu: US Department of State.
US Department of State. (2006) Internal Unrest in South Asia: Recent
Developments in Nepal and Sri Lanka Statement by Donald Camp, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs before
the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the
Paciﬁc on 15 March. Washington, DC: US Department of State. [accessed 25
August 2011] Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/ci/np/c5610.htm.
US Department of State. (2009) US-Nepal-Relations. Press Conference with
Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs on 12 February. Washington, DC: US Department of State [accessed 25
August 2011] Available at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2009/120807.htm.
US Government Printing Ofﬁce (2005) The crisis in Nepal: hearing before the
subcommittee on Asia and the paciﬁc of the committee on International
Relations, In: US House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session,
2 March 2005. Washington: US Government.
van der Westhuizen, J. (1998) ‘South Africa’s emergence as a middle power’,
Third World Quarterly, 19, 435–456.
Vaughn, B. (2008) Nepal: political developments and bilateral relations with the
United States, CRS Report for Congress. [accessed 25 August 2011] Available
at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34731.pdf.
Venkataramanan, K. (2006) ‘Indio-Sri Lanka relations: excellent, yes, but for
how Long’, Work/Focus, 313, 23–26.
The Washington Times (2005) ‘India Delivers Arms to Nepal’, 14 May 2005,
Washington.
Wickremesinghe, R. (2006) ‘Peace Process in Sri Lanka’, South Asian Survey,
15(3), 5–15.
Wolpert, S. (2010) India and Pakistan: Continued Conﬂict or Cooperation?
Berkeley: University of California Press.
India and South Asia in the world Page 33 of 33
 by guest on A
pril 25, 2013
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
